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RECENT DECISIONS
SECURED TRANSACTIONS-UNIFORM COMMERCIAL
CODE--SUBROGATION OF THIRD LIENOR TO
ORIGINAL LIEN AS AGAINST SECOND
LIENOR.
Frenoh Lumber Co. v. Commercal Realty and Fin. Co. (Mass.
1964).
French Lumber Company (French) purchased an automobile
and financed it through a secured note to Ware Trust Company
(Ware). The security agreement was duly recorded. Five months
later, French pledged its equity in the automobile to Commercial
Realty and Finance Company (Commercial) as partial security
for a loan. Commercial's security interest in the car was duly
recorded. Two months later French, in default on the original
note to Ware, refinanced the car with Associates Discount Cor-
poration and Ware was paid in full. Associates' interest in the
car was duly recorded. One year later, French was in default on
the Associates note and the automobile was repossessed and sold.
Both Associates and Commercial claimed the proceeds of the
sale and a bill in equity was brought by French to determine
the ownership of the proceeds.
HELD: Affirming the decree of the trial court, the provision
of the Uniform Commercial Code' which provides that the order
of filing determines the order of priorities among conflicting
interests in the same collateral2 does not preclude the application
of pre-existing state subrogation law to allow the third lienor to
recover under the right of the original lienor. French Lumber Co.
v. Commercial Realty and Fin. Co., 195 N.E.2d 507 (Mass. 1964).
Massachusetts is one of thirty jurisdictions which have adopted
the Uniform Commercial Code (hereafter referred to as Code).
Thus, the major determination to be made by the court was the
relation of the pre-existing law of subrogation to the Uniform
Commercial Code.
Article 9 of the Code establishes a comprehensive scheme for
the regulation of security interests in personal property and
fixtures. Article 9 is considered (by one writer closely associated
with the Code) the Code's most significant contribution to Amer-
1. Adopted by Mass. in 1958.
2. MAss. ANN. LAWS ch. 106, § 9-312(5) (a) (Special Supp. 1958). (Note:
Massachusetts citations conform to those of the Uniform Commercial Code.)
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ican statutory law.3 It has also been said that no section of Article
9 presented more difficulties or received a more thorough con-
sideration than those sections specifically dealing with pri-
orities.4
The court in this case agreed that the pertinent provision of
the Code provides that the order of filing determines the order of
priorities among conflicting interests in the same collateral ;5 it
did not find, however, that the Code prevented Associates from
succeeding to Ware's priority through subrogation. Noting that
the general provisions of the Code specify that the principles of
law and equity should supplement the Code's provisions unless
otherwise provided, 6 the court said "no provision of the Code
purports to affect the fundamental equitable doctrine of subro-
gation."17
Subrogation, which has its roots in the principles of equity,
is simply a doctrine of substitution.8 It has long been recognized
that the doctrine of subrogation does not flow from any fixed
law and is invoked in the interests of justice and equity.9 Per-
haps, as the court said in George A. Hoagland & Go. v. Decker,'0
no doctrine of equity jurisprudence is more beneficent in its
operation than is subrogation and perhaps none stands in higher
favor. In general, courts have been inclined to extend rather than
restrict the doctrine by giving it broad and liberal application in
the interests of justice."
The weight of authority in this country is that one who ad-
vances money to a debtor, at the request of the debtor, to dis-
charge a prior lien on real or personal property is entitled to
subrogation to the prior lien so discharged, as against the holder
of an intervening lien of which he was ignorant. This is the
general rule even if the intervening lien was properly recorded
3. Schnader, Foreword to Ux-uoaa COMMERCAL CODE (U.L.A.) at viii
(1962).
4. Coogan, Article 9 of the Uniform Commercial Code: Priorities Among
Secured Creditors and the "Floating Lien," 72 HARv. L. REv. 838, 855 (1959).
5. Supra note 2.
6. MAss. ANN. LAws ch. 106, § 1-103 (Special Supp. 1958).
7. French Lumber Co. v. Commercial Realty & Fin. Co., 195 N.E.2d 507,
510 (Mass. 1964).
8. Employers Mut. Liab. Ins. Co. of Wis. v. Griffin Constr. Co., 280 S.W.2d
179 (Ky. 1955).
9. Livingstain v. Columbian Banking & Trust Co., 77 S.C. 305, 57 S.E. 182
(1906).
10. 118 Neb. 194, 224 N.W. 14 (1929).
11. Mosher v. Conway, 45 Ariz. 463, 46 P2d 110 (1935); Eastern States
Petroleum Co. v. Universal Oil Products Co., 28 Del. CL. 365, 44 A.2d 11
(Del. Ch. 1945).
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and the party seeking subrogation was negligent or careless in
searching the records for prior interests. However, an important
and necessary element is that the intervening lienor suffers no
injustice: he is left occupying the same position as he did before
the original lien was discharged.12 This is the position that the
South Carolina court has taken in its most recent decisions.
13
In the instant case the evidence indicated that Associates was
ignorant of Commercial's interest in the automobile and that
Commercial would be left in exactly the same position if Asso-
ciates subrogated to Ware's rights.
Thus, the court's decision to allow Associates to subrogate to
Ware's priority was clearly in accord with the prevailing opinion
regarding subrogation. It can hardly be disputed that the deci-
sion was far more just and equitable than it would have been
had the doctrine of subrogation not been applied.
From the standpoint of the law in South Carolina, it is inter-
esting to note that it is probable that there would have been a
significant factual difference. The South Carolina Code requires
that security interests in a vehicle be listed on the owner's certifi-
cate of title.14 This is done when the lienholder files his interest
with the South Carolina Highway Department; in filing an in-
terest the lienholder must also forward the owner's certificate of
title unless it is already in the possession of a prior lienor. In
either case, in the process of filing a lien to perfect an interest
against subsequent interest holders, it is highly doubtful a lienor
could avoid discovery of prior interests in a vehicle.
The Uniform Commercial Code is presently being considered
for enactment by a joint committee of the South Carolina Gen-
eral Assembly. Enactment of the Uniform Commercial Code
would not have any effect on the recording of motor vehicle
liens.' 0
12. E.g., Wilkins v. Gibson, 13 Ga. 31, 38 S.E. 374 (1901) ; Louisville Joint
Stock Land Bank v. Bank of Pembroke, 225 Ky. 375, 9 S.W.2d 113 (1928);
Worcester No. Say. Institution v. Farwell, 292 Mass. 568, 198 N.E. 897 (1935).
See generally Annot., 70 A.L.R. 1396 (1931).
13. Meaders Bros. v. Skelton, 234 S.C. 134, 107 S.E.2d 1 (1959); James v.
Martin, 150 S.C. 75, 147 S.E. 752 (1928); Enterprise Bank v. Federal Land
Bank of Columbia, 139 S.C. 397, 138 S.E. 146 (1925). But see M. S. Bailey &
Sons v. Wood, 71 S.C. 36, 50 S.E. 631 (1904) ; Gunter v. Addy, 58 S.C. 178,
36 S.E. 553 (1899) ; Jefferies v. Allen, 29 S.C. 501, 7 S.E. 828 (1887); Calmes
v. McCracken, 8 S.C. 87 (1876). These earlier decisions did not permit subro-
gation in the absence of specific agreement or assignment, or when the new
interest holder took his interest ignorant of an intervening recorded interest.
14. S. C. CODE ANN. § 46-150 (1962).
15. Acts and Joint Resolutions, South Carolina at 2323 (1962).
16. UNIFORM COMISERCIAL CODE § 9-302(3) (b).
[Vol. 16
3
Lawrence: Recent Decision
Published by Scholar Commons,
RECENT DECISION
It is doubtful then that Associates, absent misrepresentation,
could have assumed the position of lienor without actual notice
in South Carolina. The law in South Carolina is unclear as to
whether subrogation will be denied if a subsequent lienor has
actual notice of an intervening lien.
17
Riomnm G. LAWRENCE
17. No cases have been found for this point. As to constructive notice, see
note 13, supra.
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